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CRAIG'S KALAM COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 
Stewart C. Goetz 
In his book The Kalam Cosmological Argument, I William Craig attempts to prove 
that the universe was caused to exist ex nihilo by a personal Creator. That the uni-
verse had a personal Creator is supposed to follow either from the fact that an 
actual infinite cannot exist and a beginningless temporal series of events is an 
actual infinite, or from the fact that it is impossible to traverse an actual infinite by 
successive addition and, because the temporal series of past events has been 
formed by successive addition, it cannot be actually infinite. 
I will not review the philosophical arguments adduced by Craig to support both 
the impossibility of an actual infinite and the impossibility of traversing an actual 
infinite. I find Craig'S arguments quite persuasive. However, I do not think that 
these impossibilities support the conclusion that the universe was caused to exist 
ex nihilo by a personal Creator. In Section I, I both state an objection to Craig's 
proof and the response he has given to it. Section II consists of my explanation of 
why Craig'S response is inadequate and the objection is sound. 
The objection to Craig's proof is fairly straightforward. From the fact that an 
actual infinite temporal sequence of events cannot exist, it does not immediately 
follow that the universe was caused to exist ex nihilo. Consistent with the 
impossibility of an actual infinite sequence of events is the possibility that the 
temporal sequence of events had a beginning but the universe did not. That is, 
it is possible that there is a finite temporal series of events preceded by an eternal 
quiescent or eventless universe. According to this possibility, the temporal series 
of events in the universe was initiated by a distinct personal agent but this agent 
did not create the universe ex nihilo. In other words, the first event caused by 
the agent was not the coming into being of the universe but an event in the 
already existing but previously quiescent universe. 
In response to this objection, Craig constructs the following dilemma: either 
the first event to arise in the quiescent universe was caused or it was not. Consider 
the first alternative, that it was caused. 
Either the necessary and sufficient conditions giving rise to this first 
event were eternally present or not. But if these determinate conditions 
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were eternally present, then their effect would also be eternally present, 
which makes the occurrence of a first event impossible. On the other 
hand, if the necessary and sufficient conditions for the first event were 
not eternally present in the universe, then these determinate conditions 
themselves had to arise in the universe, and we have only succeeded 
in pushing the temporal regress of events back one more event into the 
past. But we have already proved that the temporal regress of events 
cannot be actually infinite because an actual infinite cannot exist. So 
one must stop at a first event whose determinate conditions did not 
themselves arise but already existed. But this has already been shown 
to be impossible. Therefore, the first event to arise in the universe could 
not be caused. 2 
If the first event could not be caused, then it must be uncaused. That the first 
event is uncaused is the other hom of the dilemma. Craig asserts that, while it 
is logically possible that the first event is uncaused, this does not seem very 
reasonable. It is inherently implausible because the first event would arise 
inexplicably without any conditions whatsoever. In conclusion, 
if the necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of the first 
event did not exist from eternity, the first event would never occur; but 
if the necessary and sufficient conditions for the first event did exist 
from eternity, then ... there would have been no first event. Had the 
universe once been eternally and absolutely quiescent, then it never 
would have awakened from its sleep of death. But since it obviously is 
not quiescent, we may conclude that the finite temporal regress of events 
was not preceded by an eternal, absolutely quiescent universe. 3 
II 
In explaining why Craig's response to the objection that the impossibility of 
an actual infinite sequence of events does not entail that the universe was caused 
to exist ex nihilo is mistaken, it is helpful first to point out that a cause is not 
a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, as Craig assumes: To understand 
why a cause is not a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, consider two 
interlocking gears A and B. In a situation where both are simultaneously moving, 
the movement of A is necessary and sufficient for the movement of B, and the 
movement of B is necessary and sufficient for the movement of A. However, 
only one of the moving gears is causing the movement of the other. The fact 
that one gear is causing the movement of the other cannot be explained in terms 
of the relations of necessity and sufficiency, for these are identical both ways. 
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The gear which is causing the movement of the other is the one which is exercising 
its causal power on the other. Thus, the exercise of causal power is the funda-
mental concept in causation. 
Given the concept of the exercise of a causal power, the foIIowing question 
now presents itself: why is it impossible that a personal agent exercise its causal 
power to bring about a first event in a previously existent but quiescent universe? 
In response to this suggestion, Craig would probably both point out that the 
exercise of a causal power is an event and that either it was caused or it was 
not. On the one hand, if it (the initial exercise of causal power) was caused, 
then either it was caused by a second exercise of causal power which was 
exercised from eternity or it was not. If the second exercise of causal power was 
exercised from eternity, then the effect (the initial exercise of causal power) 
would be eternal and there would be no first event. On the other hand, if the 
second exercise of causal power was not eternal but arose in the universe, then 
what was the cause of that exercise of causal power? Presumably, another exercise 
of causal power by the same or a different agent. But what caused that exercise 
of causal power? Craig would claim that by maintaining that the second exercise 
of causal power was not exercised from eternity, we end up pushing the regress 
of events back step by step into the past. But is has already been proved that 
the temporal regress of events cannot be actuaIIy infinite because an actual 
infinite cannot exist. In short, the objector seems to be impaled on one of the 
horns of a dilemma like that originaIIy constructed by Craig. 
What about the other hom of this dilemma? Why is it not open to the objector 
to maintain that the personal agent's initial exercise of causal power was either 
uncaused or caused by the agent (agent-causation)? Craig would probably respond 
that an uncaused exercising of a causal power (or an uncaused agent-causing of 
an exercising of a causal power) is an inexplicable event, an event which occurs 
without any conditions. However, the objector can claim that the personal agent 
exercises its causal power for a reason (or causes its exercising of its causal 
power for a reason), where a reason is a condition but not a causal condition of 
the exercising of the causal power. 5 After all, the objector might continue, Craig 
himself concludes his argument for a personal Creator by affirming that the 
creation of the universe was "the action of a personal agent who freely (emphasis 
mine) chooses" to create the universe. 6 A personal agent which freely creates 
the universe is an agent which is not caused to exercise its causal power to 
produce its effect (or, if it caused its exercise of its causal power, then it was 
not caused to cause its exercise of causal power). Now, either the Creator's 
creative free act occurred without any conditions whatsoever, in which case, by 
his own standard, Craig would have to concede that his proof has an implausible 
conclusion, or the Creator's free act was performed for a reason, in which case 
Craig must concede that there is nothing implausible in the idea of a personal 
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agent which does not create the universe but freely exercises its causal power 
to start a finite event sequence in an already existing but quiescent universe. 
In conclusion, Craig has not proved that the universe was caused to exist ex 
nihilo by a personal Creator. If his arguments for the impossibility of an actual 
infinite or the impossibility of traversing an actual infinite are sound, what he 
has proved is either that the universe was caused to exist ex nihilo by a personal 
Creator or that the universe always existed and was quiescent until some personal 
agent initiated a finite chain of events in it. As of now, I know of no philosophical 
argument that proves the truth of one or the other of these disjuncts. 
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